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Since 9/11 Americans have focused primarily on the threat of 
international terrorism.  “International terrorism” is defined in the Patriot 
Act of 2001 (“Patriot Act”), passed immediately after the 9/11 attacks, as 
activities that: 
 
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a 
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of 
the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
 (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
 (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
 coercion; or 
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which 
they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or 
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum;1 
 
Much of the Patriot Act, as well as a large number of other statutes, 
treaties, and other legal instruments provide a legal basis for the 
investigation and prosecution of those who commit acts of “international 
terrorism.”  The federal government was reorganized after 9/11 to better 
permit our law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and military carry on 
the fight against global terrorism.2  But what of “domestic terrorism”? 
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 1.   18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2012). 
 2.   See Dana Priest & William Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control, WASH. POST 
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The Patriot Act does, in fact, define “domestic terrorism” in much the 
same language as it uses to define “international terrorism”: 
 
(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that— 
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the 
criminal laws of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended— 
 (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; 
 (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or 
 coercion; or 
 (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
assassination, or kidnapping; and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States . . .3 
 
Strangely, however, the Patriot Act provides little authority to 
prosecute “domestic terrorism,” and there are no specific laws that make 
“domestic terrorism” a crime.  Instead, law enforcement must use existing 
state and criminal laws to prosecute “domestic terrorism” even though 
domestic terrorism, as I will anecdotally suggest here, poses as much as a 
threat to the peace and stability of our nation as does “international 
terrorism.”4 
My first encounter, albeit at a distance, with domestic terrorism came 
soon after I moved to Lawrence, Kansas, to be the dean of the University 
of Kansas School of Law in June 1994.  On April 19, 1995, two 
Americans, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, blew up the Alfred P. 
Murrah Federal Office Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.5  One 
hundred and sixty-eight people are known to have been killed in that 
                                                          
(July 19, 2010), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-
growing-beyond-control/ [https://perma.cc/GYP4-FGY6] (revealing that as of 2010, thirty-three 
building complexes had been built in Washington, D.C., and the surrounding area for top-secret 
intelligence work since 9/11; 1,271 government organizations and 1,931 private companies worked 
on programs related to counterterrorism, homeland security and intelligence; and analysts published 
50,000 intelligence reports per year on documents and conversations obtained by foreign and domestic 
spying).  
 3.   18 U.S.C. § 2331(5). 
 4.   See Rafia Zakaria, The Law Needs to Catch Up with the Reality of Domestic Terrorism, 
CNN (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/29/opinions/domestic-terrorism-legal-
limitations-rafia-zakaria/index.html [https://perma.cc/C38U-ZQ6L].  See also Mary McCord, It’s 
Time for Congress to Make Domestic Terrorism a Federal Crime, LAWFARE (Dec. 5, 2018), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/its-time-congress-make-domestic-terrorism-federal-crime 
[https://perma.cc/6R68-LZZ4].  Contra Michael German & Sara Robinson, Wrong Priorities on 
Fighting Terrorism, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/ 
sites/default/files/publications/2018_10_DomesticTerrorism_V2%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/7XKE-6Z3W].  
 5.   Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 349–50 (10th Cir. 1995). 
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blast.6  Six hundred and eighty people were injured in the blast.7  Many of 
the dead and injured were children.8  America was shocked at the thought 
that two Americans could kill and wound their fellow citizens. 
Both Nichols and McVeigh held strong anti-government beliefs and, 
during their interrogations after the bombing, both cited the incidents at 
Ruby Ridge and at Waco as strong sources for their anger.9  The incident 
at Ruby Ridge occurred in 1992 when Randy Weaver, his family, and 
friends were besieged by federal law enforcement personnel for eleven 
days.10  During the siege, Weaver’s wife, son, and dog were killed as was 
a U.S. Marshal.11  The incident at Ruby Ridge thereafter became a rallying 
call for anti-government groups throughout the United States. 
The incident at Waco involved a fifty-one-day siege by federal law 
enforcement personnel of a group known as Branch Davidians, led by 
Randy Koresh at the Mount Carmel Center outside of Waco, Texas in 
1993.12  On the fifty-first day of the siege, U.S. forces launched an attack 
on the compound, a fire broke out, and seventy-five people—including 
David Koresh—died.13  The events at Waco simply added fuel to the fire 
already begun by Ruby Ridge and energized anti-government groups 
throughout the United States.  Indeed, Timothy McVeigh visited the site 
of the Waco tragedy in March 1993 and later attributed his idea to strike 
at the U.S. government to this visit.14  But how did this lead to my 
involvement with domestic terrorism?  It is because Terry Nichols’s home 
was Herrington, Kansas and because after the bombing it was discovered 
that Nichols had obtained materials that he used in the Oklahoma City 
bombing in Herrington and McPherson, Kansas. 
Nichols’s connections with Kansas, in and of themselves, were hardly 
                                                          
 6.   Id. 
 7.   Sejal H. Patel, Sorry, That’s Classified: Post-9/11 Surveillance Powers, the Sixth 
Amendment, and Niebuhrian Ethics, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 287, 299 n.56 (2014). 
 8.   Victims of the Murrah Building Bombing, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2000), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/victims-of-the-murrah-building-bombing/ [https://perma.cc/2YLJ-
46B3]. 
 9.   Dara Lind, Waco and Ruby Ridge: the 1990s Standoffs Haunting the Oregon Takeover, 
Explained, VOX (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/5/10714746/waco-ruby-ridge-oregon 
[https://perma.cc/ZVD9-4VNS]. 
 10.   Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443, 
454 (1995). 
 11.   Id. 
 12.   Id. at 455–56. 
 13.   Id. at 456. 
 14.   Jesse Greenspan, Waco, 20 Years Later: Where Are They Now?, HISTORY (Feb. 28, 2013), 
https://www.history.com/news/waco-20-years-later-where-are-they-now [https://perma.cc/57BT-
HGZ2] (noting that McVeigh reportedly told his father following his conviction that “[i]t was a bunch 
of stuff the government did, and the last straw was Waco”). 
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enough to lead to my “connection” with domestic terrorism.  However, 
there were rumors at the time that Nichols had been involved with the 
militia movement in Western Kansas.  There has been a long history of 
militias in the United States.  Originally, every state had a militia.15  These 
were progenitors of modern National Guard units and were an important 
component of our national military.16  The modern militia movement, 
however, is quite different.  Modern militias are private groups organized 
in quasi-military format.17  Some are quite innocent and law-abiding.  
Others, however, consist of members who hold anti-government views, 
and some are connected to various white nationalist movements.18  Often 
these groups engage in combat training.  Many of the more extreme militia 
groups believe that the current federal government is illegal and 
illegitimate and see themselves as protectors of the “true” Constitution as 
it was intended by the Founders.19  Indeed, one of the most popular 
symbols of the modern militia movement is the Gadsden flag, designed by 
Revolutionary War General Christopher Gadsden, which carries the motto 
“Don’t Tread on Me,” and became a potent symbol of American resistance 
to British tyranny.20  McVeigh’s statements after he was captured made it 
clear that he supported many of the ideals of the modern militia movement, 
even though he was not an actual militia member.  In 2017, the Southern 
Poverty Law Center identified 689 anti-government groups in the United 
States, of which 273 were militias.21  The Miami Herald estimated that 
there were 165 armed anti-government militias in 2016 and 276 armed 
militias in 2015.22  In other words, there are tens of thousands of armed, 
anti-government militia members in the United States.  Some live in 
Kansas.  Once again, it is important to note that membership in a militia is 
not illegal, nor is being armed or holding anti-government views.  These 
are all activities that are constitutionally protected.  However, militias 
frighten many Americans—especially government officials—who see 
them as “domestic terrorists.”  And that is how I came to have an 
                                                          
 15.   Chuck Dougherty, The Minutemen, the National Guard and the Private Militia Movement: 
Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 959, 964–68 (1995). 
 16.   Id. at 969.  
 17.   Daryl Johnson, Hate in God’s Name, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.splcenter.org/20170925/hate-god%E2%80%99s-name [https://perma.cc/H455-NBEZ]. 
 18.   Id. 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   Id. 
 21.   Antigovernment Movement, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/ideology/antigovernment [https://perma.cc/6Z3Z-9TGQ] (last visited Mar. 24, 
2019). 
 22.   Teresa Welsh, Domestic Militia Groups Plummet 40 Percent Amid Trump Rise, MIAMI 
HERALD (Feb. 15, 2017, 4:57 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article 
132948254.html [https://perma.cc/4XZW-FFEP].   
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involvement with the militia movement. 
In 1995 the University of Kansas welcomed a new Chancellor, Robert 
Hemenway.  As all new senior university officers must, Chancellor 
Hemenway spent much of his first year meeting Kansas officials.  At one 
dinner he spent some time talking to the newly-elected governor Bill 
Graves.  Governor Graves mentioned that a group of militia members from 
Western Kansas had been coming regularly to the Washburn University 
Law Library and studying various volumes of the United States Code 
housed there.  According to the Governor, this was making some folks at 
Washburn rather nervous and was also troubling to the Governor and his 
advisors.  In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing and with 
knowledge of Terry Nichols’s Kansas connections, people were 
wondering what these folks were up to at Washburn’s law library.  The 
Governor also made it clear that the visiting militia members were 
perfectly respectable and respectful and had done nothing but exercise 
their right to use the library.  Chancellor Hemenway, for reasons that I will 
never divine, immediately offered to send his Law Dean—me—to meet 
with representatives of the militia in Western Kansas in the hope of 
discovering what was going on and whether there was any potential danger 
to the people of Kansas.23 
When the Chancellor called me the next day to tell me that he had 
volunteered my services to Governor Graves as an unofficial emissary to 
militia members in Western Kansas, I was, to say the least, somewhat 
perturbed.  Indeed, I believe that my first response was to say: “Chancellor, 
are you out of your mind?” followed by “Sir, do you really think that a 
Jewish lawyer from New York is the best choice for this duty?”  
Apparently, he did because I soon found myself making arrangements with 
members of the Governor’s staff to attend a meeting with selected militia 
members in Western Kansas.  I decided that I did not want to go alone so 
I asked a new member of the faculty, a native Kansan and constitutional 
law scholar, Steve McAllister, to accompany me, which he bravely did.24  
Together we drove several hours west from Lawrence on the appointed 
day and stopped at the courthouse in the Western Kansas town in which 
our meeting was scheduled.  We proceeded to a room in the basement of 
the otherwise empty courthouse and were greeted very warmly by three 
people. 
                                                          
 23.   As it turns out, Kansas is not the only state in which law libraries have had to deal with 
“constitutionalist” patrons.  See Vicenc Feliu, Meeting the Needs of Constitutionalist Patrons: A Guide 
for Reference Librarians, 25 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 89 (2006). 
 24.   Steve, of course, has gone on to great distinction and serves as the E.S. & Tom W. Hampton 
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Kansas and the United States Attorney for the 
District of Kansas. 
718 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
We spent approximately three hours with the militia members in the 
courthouse meeting room.  They were intelligent and friendly, and 
explained to us that their group believed that the federal government, as it 
was then constituted, was unconstitutional and illegitimate.  The militia 
members thought the government was plotting to harm the members of 
militia groups in Kansas and around the United States because these 
groups of patriots were attempting to convince the American people that 
our government was illegitimate and corrupt.  They explained that they 
were going through the United States Code so that they could identify 
every unconstitutional law contained therein.  We spent quite a bit of time 
discussing what they had discovered.  Chief among their discoveries was 
that the bank moratorium established by Franklin D. Roosevelt in response 
to the Great Depression was unconstitutional and still in force since they 
could not find a statute explicitly repealing it.  They also believed that the 
abandonment of the gold standard by the United States was 
unconstitutional.  They raised quite a few questions about the 
constitutionality of the Federal Reserve.  In addition, they told us that the 
federal government was using military forces to harass and threaten militia 
members and that they waited each night for Black Hawk helicopters to 
appear above their homes and begin firing.  Not surprisingly, both Waco 
and Ruby Ridge featured prominently in the discussion. 
There was no mention of armed rebellion by these folks, nor did they 
threaten any kind of violence against federal or state government.  In fact, 
much to my surprise, these people were determined to study the federal 
code and use its contents as the basis for proving that the current 
government was unconstitutional and, therefore, all of its acts were 
invalid.25  It was very clear that the militia members to whom we spoke 
were highly legalistic and were determined to use the law against the 
federal government.  Perhaps there were darker currents flowing through 
this group, but in their discussions with us they talked law not weapons. 
After my meeting with the militia folks in Western Kansas I became 
quite curious about the legalism I saw displayed during the meeting and 
began to do research into the militia and anti-government movements.  It 
was then that I began to do some research into the “Common Law courts” 
movement.  In the wake of the Oklahoma City a number of legal scholars, 
                                                          
 25.   Interestingly, a version of this argument was made by Secretary of State Michael Pompeo 
in relation to the Maduro government in Venezuela on January 24, 2019.  See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Organization of American States (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/01/288560.htm [https://perma.cc/D7LU-YFFV].  
According to Secretary Pompeo, the election which put Nicolas Maduro in office was illegal and, 
therefore, all acts of his government are “illegitimate and invalid.”  Id. 
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particularly those in states with strong militia movements began to write 
about these “Common Law courts.”  Among the various articles on the 
subject, I think that the best is that published by Daniel Lessard Levin and 
Michael W. Mitchell in the South Dakota Law Review in 1995.26 
Levin and Mitchell trace the origins and philosophy of the Common 
Law court movement to the participants’ failure to prevail on their claims 
in legitimate courts and their unwillingness to accept the legitimacy of 
state federal courts as a result: 
Various predecessors of the common-law court movement have been 
active for over fifteen years; however, there has recently been a 
substantial increase in the number of cases reaching the courts as a result 
of common-law court activities which present novel constitutional 
claims. Many of these cases have arisen out of activists’ claims that they 
are exempt from taxes because they do not live within an area under the 
jurisdiction of the United States government, that taxes are part of a 
voluntary contract from which they may excuse themselves, or that the 
change from the gold standard in 1933 means that the courts no longer 
have the proper jurisdiction to enforce tax cases. Other cases have 
concerned diverse types of legal conflicts as activists challenge 
everything from speeding tickets to D.U.I. convictions to custody 
disputes.27 
And: 
Common-law court activists have also used the legitimate courts to 
challenge the legitimacy of the government as a whole and the courts 
specifically. One favorite claim is that federal and state courts operate 
improperly as admiralty courts whenever they display a flag with gold 
fringe. Activists with a conspiratorial bent have accused judicial officers 
of being “Foreign Double Agents with full intent to overthrow our 
Constitutional Freely Associated Compact States of our Constitutional 
Republic” and held a federal judge in contempt of court on their authority 
as individual sovereigns. Other activists have rejected the government’s 
authority over them because they have a special status as “natural 
individuals” or “Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota” that 
exempts them from the obligations of United States citizens. In response, 
the judiciary has increasingly sanctioned those who file such frivolous 
suits.28 
Interestingly, Levin and Mitchell see these courts, and the movements 
behind them, as examples of “American nationalism” and social 
                                                          
 26.   Daniel Lessard Levin & Michael W. Mitchell, A Law Unto Themselves: the Ideology of the 
Common Law Court Movement, 44 S.D. L. REV. 9 (1999). 
 27.   Id. at 10–11. 
 28.   Id. at 11. 
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“fundamentalism,” terms that continue to be controversial today.29  While 
one may debate the historical, social, and philosophical aspects of the 
Common Law courts, they are fascinating as an indicator of the 
importance of maintaining a legal or “pseudo-legal” justification of the 
militia movement’s rejection of mainline legal theory and institutions 
while at the same time emphasizing the importance of a legal framework 
to legitimate their actions.30 
Vicenc Feliu, who was the Foreign, Comparative Law, and 
International Law Librarian at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center Library at 
Louisiana State University in 2006, wrote of his thoughts on serving 
patrons he classified as “constitutionalists,”—those who denied the 
legitimacy of mainstream courts and government—including Common 
Law court supporters.  He described these patrons as: 
[T]he typical Constitutionalist patrons I became acquainted with during 
my stay at the Gallagher Law Library reference desk was a WASP male, 
“somewhere on the border between middle and old age.” My experiences 
at the Gallagher Law Library with Constitutionalist patrons also showed 
that the majority tended to be self-educated, self-taught in the law, and 
working pro se. As a result of their focus on legal self reliance, the 
Constitutionalist patron is a phenomenon more often encountered in 
public access libraries. Institutions that restrict access to students or 
members are less likely to be used by these patrons since they avoid 
membership in the mainstream legal world.31 
His comments on patrons who identified themselves as involved in the 
Common Law courts movement are also quite enlightening: 
Constitutionalist patrons can also come from members of the Common-
Law Courts movement. Common-Law Courts are courts organized at the 
local level outside the recognized judicial system that purportedly apply 
principles of common law to resolve disputes and adjudicate criminal 
matters. These courts are based on those developed by the Posse 
Comitatus Movement, and like them, they meet in private homes or 
community places. Some of these courts act as instruments of harassment 
to public officials and the established legal system; others appear to be 
sincere attempts to implement the beliefs of their members by freeing 
themselves from what they perceive as state tyranny and holding public 
officials accountable. Common-Law Courts have been active in their 
efforts to intimidate public officials and judges by issuing indictments, 
subpoenas, and by placing common-law liens on the property of those 
                                                          
 29.   Id. 
 30.   Francis X. Sullivan, The “Usurping Octopus of Jurisdictional/Authority”: The Legal 
Theories of the Sovereign Citizen Movement, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 785, 823 (1999). 
 31.   Feliu, supra note 23, at 91–92 (quoting Mary Whisner, Dictionaries Make Strange 
Bedfellows, LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE 93, 93 (Marlyn Robinson 
ed., 2003)). 
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failing to comply with their demands. Adherents of these beliefs propose 
that the authority of their Common-Law Courts is based on the 
Constitution, as interpreted by them, because they claim to be the highest 
sovereign power they designate their Common-Law Courts as the “One 
Supreme Court.” 
Constitutionalist patrons present a special challenge for the reference 
librarian because those patrons seek to interpret existing law using 
sources and materials that are not current or up to date. In addition to 
favoring antiquated materials, these patrons also seek to support their 
legal arguments through convoluted connections to arcane law or 
through unrelated materials based on their interpretation of their favored 
old re-sources. The reference librarian, trained in the law and generally 
working with patrons who are either also trained in the law or working 
to resolve problems using existing law, has to change his or her working 
paradigm radically to meet the information needs of a Constitutionalist 
patron effectively.32 
It would be relatively easy to dismiss the adherents of the Common 
Law court movement as harmless eccentrics—especially if there is little 
or no evidence that they are violent.33  In effect, those who are involved 
with the movement might be characterized simply as using alternative 
dispute resolution methods in lieu of the courts, activities that we now 
accept as quite legitimate.  The problem was and continues to be that the 
Common Law courts are not simply used to adjudicate disputes among 
those who use them.34  Instead, the Common Law courts have been used 
to harass and intimidate judges and legislators.35  The means of this 
intimidation have been Common Law court processes brought against 
judicial and governmental officials, the results of which are the issuance 
by the court of judgments against the officials.36  Often these are financial 
judgments that find the officials financially liable to those who brought the 
cases.  Indeed, these judgments are then translated into official looking 
documents, which supposedly may be used against the defendants’ 
property.37  Stories of such judgments and lien documents targeted at 
judicial and governmental officials in states in which there are Common 
Law courts are legion.  In the aftermath of my visit with the militia 
members in 1995, I often heard such stories when I inquired about these 
courts. 
                                                          
 32.   Id. at 94–95. 
 33.   Susan P. Koniak, The Chosen People in Our Wilderness - Gathering Storm: America’s 
Militia Threat by Morris Dees with James Corcoran, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1761, 1761, 1798 (1997). 
 34.   Id. at 94. 
 35.   Levin & Mitchell, supra note 26, at 33. 
 36.   Id. 
 37.   Id. 
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Again, such proceedings, court decisions, and documents would, in a 
perfect world, have no real effect.  Unfortunately, many legitimate 
government officials, such as county records officials and even sheriffs 
have mistaken these documents for the real thing.  In Minnesota, the 
problem became so severe, that in 1996, the Attorney General issued a 
formal letter that a sheriff is not “authorized to ‘serve’ documents that 
purport on their face to give notice of proceedings in ‘courts’ that are not 
established by law . . . .”38  The problem became so serious that by 1998 
twenty-seven states enacted laws prohibiting Common Law courts or the 
issuance of false legal documents.39 
My third encounter with “domestic terrorism” came when I was 
researching a biography that I had been asked to write for the Federal 
District Court for the District of Kansas.  It has become a tradition at the 
Court that when a judge retires a short biography of the judge is 
commissioned.  I was fortunate enough to be asked to write the biography 
of Judge Kathryn Vratil, the first woman to serve on the District Court and 
to serve as Chief Judge of the Court.  Judge Vratil was a pioneer in many 
ways and her life has been filled with both excitement and great 
achievements.  But I discovered that a federal judge’s life is not quite so 
quiet or safe as I had once imagined.  While going through the Judge’s 
papers, I discovered that she had been the target of threats by a domestic 
terrorist. 
Judge Vratil was not the first Kansas federal judge to be the target of 
terrorism.  On August 5, 1993, Jack Gary McKnight was to appear in 
federal court in Topeka for sentencing on drug and firearms charges.40  
McKnight did not appear at the court.41  Instead, he went on a violent 
rampage, exploding a truck bomb in Oskaloosa and then invading the 
Topeka courthouse firing shots in the hallways and chambers and 
attempting to explode a pipe bomb.42  He killed or wounded five people 
before he killed himself.43 
                                                          
 38.   Sheriffs: Service of Process, Minn. Op. Atty. Gen. 390a-21 (Nov. 5, 1996), 
http://www.ag.state.mn.us/office/Opinions/390a21-19961105.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHX9-BC85].  
 39.   27 States Act Against Antigovernment Movement’s Common Law Courts, INTELLIGENCE 
RPT., June 15, 1998, https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/1998/27-states-act-
against-antigovernment-movement’s-common-law-courts [https://perma.cc/FXS3-PDLF].  
 40.   On this incident see M.H. Hoeflich et al., A Pioneer Judge. Judge Kathryn Vratil 
(forthcoming 2020).  See also, Tim Hrenchir, 25 Years Ago This Week: History Guy recalls attack on 
Topeka’s Carlson Federal Building, TOPEKA CAP. J., (Aug. 1, 2018, 10:49 PM), 
https://www.cjonline.com/news/20180801/25-years-ago-this-week-history-guy-recalls-attack-on-
topekas-carlson-federal-building [https://perma.cc/VTR6-M35U].  
 41.   Hrenchir, supra note 40.  
 42.   Id. 
 43.   Id. 
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Twenty-two years after McKnight’s attack on the federal court in 
Topeka, Judge Vratil received a letter on August 1, 2005 from Robert S. 
Milton, then serving a sentence in a federal prison in California.44  The 
letter threatened Judge Vratil with death: “I’m only writing you this letter 
so you’ll know whom is having you and your family executed for crimes 
against humanity.”45  It is notable not only that the letter threatened to kill 
both Judge Vratil and her family but also that it was couched in legalistic 
terms (“crimes against humanity”).46  Here, again, we see the propensity 
of domestic terrorists to justify their actions on allegedly legal bases. 
Although Milton, happily, did not act on his threats, they had to be 
taken quite seriously.  In February 2005, the husband and the mother of 
federal Judge Joan Lefkow, a District Court Judge in Chicago, were 
brutally murdered.47 
Judge Lefkow, in the years before the murders, had been provided 
with twenty-four-hour security by U.S. Marshals because of fear that 
Matthew Hale, a white supremacist over whose trial she had presided, 
would take action against her.48  Although the murder of Judge Lefkow’s 
family members was a first, federal judges had been killed before.  At least 
one of those murders—that of Judge Robert Vance in 1988—may have 
been linked to extremists.49  Thus, Milton’s threatening letter to Judge 
                                                          
 44.   See Memorandum of Matters Discussed and Action Taken at Pretrial Conference 1, United 
States v. Milton, No. 05-20089-01 DW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31097 (D. Kan. May 9, 2006) (noting 
that Mr. Milton was charged with “mailing threatening communications”). 
 45.   The letter and accompanying documents may be found in Judge Vratil’s official papers now 
at the Kansas State Historical Society in Topeka.  These papers may be viewed only with permission.  
See also California State Inmate Gets 10 Years for Threatening Federal Judge, 13 WIBW (Nov. 22, 
2006, 9:58 AM), https://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/4719616.html [http://perma.cc/VF2B-
MHCG].  
 46.   Id. 
 47.   Amanda Paulson & Brad Knickerbocker, Chicago Murders Spotlight Risks to Judges, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 3, 2005), https://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0303/p03s01-
usju.html [http://perma.cc/QM9W-G9CE].  See also Jodi Wilgoren, Electrician Says in Suicide Note 
That He Killed Judge’s Family, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2005/03/11/us/electrician-says-in-suicide-note-that-he-killed-judges-family.html [http://perma.cc/ 
H2RT-9XKC]. 
 48.   Paulson & Knickerbocker, supra note 47.  Ultimately, Bart Ross—a cancer patient whose 
malpractice case was dismissed by Judge Lefkow—confessed to the murders in a note.  Wilgoren, 
supra note 47.  Ross had no known connections with white supremacy groups.  Id.  Interestingly, 
Matthew Hale was also the center of important litigation on the interaction of the power of State 
character and fitness committees’ ability to exclude applicants from admission to the Bar and the First 
Amendment.  Hale v. Comm. on Character & Fitness for Ill., 335 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2003).   
 49.   Associated Press, Letter Bomb Kills U.S. Appeals Judge, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1989), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/17/us/letter-bomb-kills-us-appeals-judge.html [https://perma.cc 
/U65G-DG4M].  His murderer, Walter Leroy Moody, was executed on April 19, 2018.  Moody had 
also sent a bomb letter to the NAACP Regional Office in Atlanta and its Jacksonville branch.  See 
Kent Faulk, ‘Why my dad?’ Judge Recalls Father’s Legacy as Bomber’s Execution Nears, AL.COM 
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Vratil could not be dismissed, particularly since its threat against her 
family echoed the killing of Judge Lefkow’s family mere months before. 
Although the incidents and literature I have cited in this essay 
occurred, for the most part, two decades ago, I believe that they are 
important to us today.  Why?  My answer is simple.  There seems little 
doubt that the United States is currently seriously divided along political, 
social, and racial lines, perhaps more so than ever before in the modern 
era.50  We see increasing militancy on the part of “white nationalists” as 
evidenced by the violence at Charlottesville and other protests during the 
past two years.51  The rhetoric of white nationalism, espoused even by 
government officials such as Iowa Congressman Steve King,52 has 
increasingly become public and more strident.  To put it plainly, many of 
the activities described in this essay continue today and pose a serious 
threat to public security.  The fact that so much of our legislative and legal 
focus since 9/11 has been on the threat of international terrorism has 
distracted from what I believe to be the very real potential threat from 
domestic terrorism that may face us today. 
We in the United States have tended to be reactive rather than 
proactive in the face of internal and external threats.  One need only look 
at all of the warning signs that preceded 9/11 to realize that we, as a nation, 
tend to react to threats only after a tragedy has occurred.  In recent years 
both the federal and state government have done much to counter external 
terrorist threats, but done far less on the domestic front.  Of course, 
constitutional limitations make domestic legislation far more difficult.  But 
I am becoming far more alarmed that we are simply in a waiting period 
prior to another incident like the Oklahoma City bombing.  I fear, as well, 
that the public and legislative reaction to increased anti-terrorism activities 
focused on international terrorism, will impede the ability of law 
                                                          
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/birmingham/2018/04/circuit_judge_bob_vance_talks.html 
[https://perma.cc/DJH4-LRGJ].  
 50.   See, e.g., Livia Gershon, Just How Divided Are Americans Since Trump’s Election?, 
HISTORY (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.history.com/news/just-how-divided-are-americans-since-
trumps-election [https://perma.cc/VA77-GCS6].  
 51.   See generally, Dara Lind, Unite the Right, the violent white supremacist rally in 
Charlottesville, explained, VOX (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2017/8/12/16138246/ 
charlottesville-nazi-rally-right-uva [https://perma.cc/G7QP-RQFB]; Emily Moon, How has White 
Nationalism Changed in the Year Since Charlottesville?, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 10, 2018), 
https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-has-white-nationalism-changed-in-the-year-since-
charlottesville [https://perma.cc/C5SR-ALUQ].  
 52.   See Jacob Kurtz, Republicans, Including Iowa Senators, Pile on Condemnation for Steve 




2019 REFLECTIONS UPON TERRORISM 725 
enforcement to counter domestic terrorism.53 
Finally, I think that it is extremely important for the legal profession 
to recognize that the inclination of the radical right in the United States to 
justify their actions by reference to “pseudo-legal” doctrine puts a 
particular burden on lawyers to counter these spurious arguments both in 
public and in private.  The general public does not know or understand the 
complexities of legislative and legal doctrine.  Many of the arguments and 
the rhetoric used by domestic terrorists like Robert Milton or by Common 
Law courts seem, on the surface, to make sense.  Especially in a world in 
which the idea of “alternate facts” has become acceptable in some circles, 
it is important for lawyers and judges to educate the public on what the 
law actually says and means to counter the pseudo-law that is espoused by 
those who oppose legitimate government.  In sum, this essay reflects a 
growing concern on my part at our unwillingness to confront the dangers 
that face us today on the domestic front. 
 
                                                          
 53.   I am particularly concerned with the “push back” against efforts by law enforcement to track 
the movements and activities of “bad actors.”  In particular, I am concerned with the implications of 
such cases as Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018), which, in my opinion, severely limits 
the ability of law enforcement to track terrorists in the United States. 
